Subjectively defined optimal/non-optimal time of day modulates controlled but not automatic retrieval processes in verbal memory by Puttaert, Delphine et al.
R E GU L A R R E S E A R CH PA P E R
Subjectively‐defined optimal/non‐optimal time of day
modulates controlled but not automatic retrieval processes in
verbal memory
Delphine Puttaert1,2,3 | Stéphane Adam4 | Philippe Peigneux1,3
1UR2NF – Neuropsychology and Functional
Neuroimaging Research Unit at CRCN,
Center for Research in Cognition and
Neurosciences, Université libre de Bruxelles
(ULB), Brussels, Belgium
2LCFC – Laboratoire de Cartographie
fonctionnelle du Cerveau, Université libre
de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium
3UNI – ULB Neurosciences Institute,
Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels,
Belgium
4Psychology of Aging Unit, University of
Liège (ULiege), Liège, Belgium
Correspondence
Philippe Peigneux and Delphine Puttaert,
Centre for Research in Cognition &





Performance for controlled, resource‐demanding retrieval in episodic memory has
been consistently found to be better at an optimal compared with non‐optimal time
of the day, evidencing a synchrony effect. However, performance in memory tasks in
which retrieval is mostly based on automatic processes was inconclusively found
either to be better at a non‐optimal time of day or independent of synchrony effects.
A caveat in most prior studies is that optimal/non‐optimal time of day is based on
morningness–eveningness composite scores derived from chronotype questionnaires,
which might not efficiently predict subjectively‐defined cognitive efficiency periods.
An additional caveat is that separate tasks are used to assess explicit and implicit
retrieval in verbal memory. Indeed, no task is process‐pure, and both controlled and
automatic retrieval processes may potentially contribute to retrieval scores in differ-
ent types of memory tasks. In the present study, we investigated the impact of indi-
vidually defined subjective optimal/non‐optimal time of day on verbal memory
retrieval, using an adaptation of the Process‐Dissociation Procedure that allows esti-
mating the respective contributions of automatic and controlled memory retrieval
processes within the same memory task. Our results disclose a higher involvement of
controlled processes at subjectively optimal compared with non‐optimal time of day,
but no differences for automatic processes. Synchrony effects and subjectively‐de-
fined peaks and troughs of performance for controlled components of memory retrie-
val should be considered in the evaluation of episodic memory.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The circadian rhythm, described as a nearly 24‐hr endogenous oscil-
latory variation for sleep propensity, is known to modulate cognitive
efficiency in various domains (Schmidt, Collette, Cajochen, &
Peigneux, 2007), such as sensory (Lotze, Wittmann, von Steinbüchel,
Pöppel, & Roenneberg, 1999), motor (Edwards, Waterhouse, & Reilly,
2007), vigilance (Graw, Krauchi, Knoblauch, Wirz‐Justice, & Cajo-
chen, 2004) and memory (Ramírez et al., 2006), with generally better
performance during day than night time. Additionally, there are
inter‐individual differences in the phase and timing of the circadian
oscillations. Morning‐type chronotypes or “larks” tend to wake up
early in the morning and feel the need for sleep already at early
hours in the evening. Conversely, evening‐type chronotypes or
“owls” feel a need for sleep later in the night and wake up later in
the morning. Synchrony effects, i.e. better performance at a specific
time of the day for a given chronotype, were evidenced in different
cognitive domains. Participants tested at their optimal moment of
the day (i.e. putatively the morning for “Morning types” and the
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evening for “Evening types”) exhibited better performance in execu-
tive functions (Hasher, Goldstein, & May, 2005; May & Hasher,
1998; Yoon, May, & Hasher, 1999) and attentional (Correa, Molina,
& Sanabria, 2014; Natale, Alzani, & Cicogna, 2003) tasks, as well as
a reduced inclination for stereotypic judgements (Bodenhausen,
1990). Additionally, retrieval in declarative memory was found to be
more efficient at an optimal compared with non‐optimal time of day
(Hasher, Chung, May, & Foong, 2002; Hasher et al., 2005; May,
Hasher, & Stoltzfus, 1993; May & Hasher, 1998; Yang, Hasher, &
Wilson, 2007). By contrast, synchrony effects are less consistent for
implicit and procedural memory tasks, in which performance mostly
relies on automatic retrieval processes. Indeed, some studies found a
facilitating effect at non‐optimal time of day for implicit memory
tasks (Delpouve, Schmitz, & Peigneux, 2014; May, Hasher, & Foong,
2005; Rothen & Meier, 2016), whereas others failed (Yang et al.,
2007), suggesting that automatic memory retrieval processes might
not, or barely, be modulated by time of day fluctuations.
Inconsistent findings may stem from caveats in previous works.
First, most prior studies that tested memory functions using separate
memory tasks presumed assessing the procedural and declarative
components separately. However, no task is process‐pure (Jacoby,
1991), and cross‐contamination between explicit and implicit mem-
ory processes may not be excluded within a task. Second, the opti-
mal and non‐optimal moments for testing are most often arbitrarily
defined based on a chronotype score derived from the Morning-
ness–Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ; Horne & Östberg, 1976).
This approach does not take into account the multi‐determined (i.e.
biological, cognitive and social) and inter‐individual characteristics
that might make a moment of the day optimal or not for cognitively
demanding tasks (Dijk & von Schantz, 2005).
In the present study, we evaluated participants at their specific
optimal/non‐optimal time of day, subjectively defined in terms of the
maximal/minimal 2‐hr periods for cognitive efficiency. We also used
an adaptation (Adam, Van der Linden, Collette, Lemauvais, & Salmon,
2005) of the Process‐Dissociation Procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991)
aimed at determining the respective contributions of controlled and
automatic processes within a unique verbal memory task. We
hypothesized that controlled retrieval processes in episodic verbal
memory are more efficient at the optimal time of day, that is when
participants are tested at a time they feel their cognitive resources
are maximal, as opposed to a non‐optimal time. Regarding the auto-
matic retrieval of information, we hypothesized that it could be para-
doxically more efficient at a non‐optimal time of day when the
efficiency of controlled processes is lowered, and thus opposes less
the automatic components of memory retrieval (Delpouve et al.,
2014; Schmidt et al., 2007).
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Population and protocol
Forty French‐speaking young adults aged 20–28 years (mean age =
23.35 ± 1.76 years) gave their informed consent to participate in this
experiment conducted in agreement with the ethical principles of
the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Faculty Advisory
Ethics committee. Exclusion criteria were excessive alcohol or psy-
choactive substance consumption, major neurological or psychiatric
illness, extreme morning or evening chronotype (score ≤ 30 or ≥ 70
on the MEQ), bad sleep quality (score > 7 on the Pittsburgh Sleep
Quality Index [PSQI]; Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman, & Kupfer,
1989) and jet lag > 2 hr in the previous month. Participants were
tested within a consecutive 2‐hr period defined based on their
answers to the perceived cognitive efficiency questionnaire (see
below). Half of them were tested at the time of day they perceived
as being optimal for their cognitive performance. The other half
were evaluated at the time of day perceived as non‐optimal. Partici-
pants were randomly allocated to the optimal or non‐optimal experi-
mental conditions. Participants filled in the perceived cognitive
efficiency questionnaire approximately 2 weeks before their experi-
mental session. The session included completion of questionnaires,
administration of the Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT; Dinges &
Powell, 1985) and of the experimental PDP task (see below). The
duration of the session ranged from 1 hr to 1 hr 40 min.
2.2 | Materials and procedure
2.2.1 | Questionnaires
The PSQI (Buysse et al., 1989) assessed sleep quality and quantity
for the month prior to the experiment. The St Mary's Hospital Sleep
Questionnaire (Ellis et al., 1981) assessed sleep quality and quantity
for the night preceding the testing day. The MEQ (Horne & Östberg,
1976) determined the participant's chronotype. Participants also
completed the Beck Depression Inventory‐II (BDI‐II; Beck, Steer, &
Brown, 1996) to exclude the presence of depression that may
impact cognitive processes, as well as the French adaptation of the
Mill‐Hill Part B Vocabulary test (Deltour, 1993) considering that the
experimental verbal task partly relies on the participants’ vocabulary
expertise.
2.2.2 | Optimal/non‐optimal subjective efficiency
scale
The subjective efficiency scale (Figure 1) aimed at determining the
time of day that each participant subjectively perceived as being
usually most optimal (respectively, non‐optimal) for cognitive perfor-
mance during a normal day (from 07:00 to 19:00 hours).
2.2.3 | Verbal memory task and Process‐
Dissociation Procedure
A detailed presentation of the verbal memory task and the theoreti-
cal framework of the PDP is provided elsewhere (Adam et al., 2005).
The experimental task consisted of the continuous presentation on a
computer screen of six sets of 16 words, randomly selected from a
list of 96 French language bisyllabic words (e.g. “chaque”). Each word
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was presented once, and participants were instructed to memorize
it. The first syllable of the presented word (i.e. the word‐stem; e.g.
“cha…”) was then presented after a variable lag interval (i.e. after 0,
3 or 12 intermediate words; Figure 2). The instruction was to com-
plete the word‐stem either with the previously presented word
(Inclusion condition) or with a new, different word (Exclusion condi-
tion). In the Inclusion condition, if participants could not consciously
complete the stem with the previously presented word, they were
instructed to complete it with the first word that came to their mind.
Thus, performance in the Inclusion condition was potentially sup-
ported by controlled (with a probability C) or automatic (with a prob-
ability A) memory retrieval processes, or by a combination of both.
In the Exclusion condition, participants who consciously remembered
the previously presented word are able to avoid reproducing it to
comply with the instruction to produce a different word (e.g. “cha‐
cal”). If, however, they generate the previously presented word in
spite of the instruction, it suggests that the participant had no con-
trolled knowledge about that word, and that her/his response was
driven by the automatic trend to complete the stem with a familiar
item (e.g. “cha‐que”). Alternatively, inappropriate generation of a pre-
viously seen word in the Exclusion condition could be due to failed
recollection and chance level. To control for this possibility, Adam et
al. (2005) proposed a Baseline condition with 16 stems correspond-
ing to words never presented in the learning list. Participants were
instructed to give the first word that came to their mind. With this
condition, it is possible to verify that automatic processes corre-
spond to the unconscious influence of memory, by showing that
estimates of automatic processes are significantly above the base‐
rate or chance level to produce specific target words in response to
a stem.
The 96 items were divided into six blocks of 16 items each: 16
items in the baseline condition, 16 items for Lag 0 (8 items in the
Inclusion condition and 8 items in the Exclusion condition), 16 items
for Lag 3 and 16 items for Lag 12 in the Inclusion condition, 16
items for Lag 3 and 16 items for Lag 12 in the Exclusion condition.
Considering that the Inclusion score reflects both C and A (Inclusion
= C + A(1 − C)) influences, and the Exclusion score reflects the
opposition between C and A (Exclusion = A*(1 − C)) influences, it is
thus mathematically possible computing estimates of C and A pro-
cesses and how they are modulated by subjective time of day. Con-
dition order (Inclusion versus Exclusion) and Time of day (Optimal
versus Non‐Optimal) were randomly counterbalanced across partici-
pants.
2.2.4 | Sleepiness and vigilance
Before the PDP task, the 10‐min version of the PVT (Dinges &
Powell, 1985) was administrated. In this task, participants must press
a response button as soon as a countdown clock appears on the
screen, at variable intervals. Participants were also administered the
At which time of the day (2 h) do you usually feel at your best and your worst to  
perform on cognitive tasks?
My optimal moment:
My non-optimal moment:
F IGURE 1 Cognitive efficiency scale
pensif / copeau / cop--- bor--- pen---
Lag 0 Lag 3
Lag 12
F IGURE 2 Experimental task. A complete word is first presented (e.g. French words “copeau”, “borgne”, “pensif”, …); the corresponding
word‐stem is then presented after a variable lag interval ranging 0 (“cop—”), 3 (“bor—”) or 12 (“pen—”) words. Participants are instructed to
complete the word‐stem either with the previously presented word (Inclusion condition) or with a different one (Exclusion condition). Adapted
from Adam et al. (2005)
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Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) before
and immediately after the experimental PDP task.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Questionnaires, vocabulary and time of
testing
As shown in Table 1, chronotype score was similar between partici-
pants tested at their Optimal versus Non‐Optimal moment (t38 =
0.59, p = .558). The range of MEQ scores was 33–67, thus partici-
pants were neutral (N = 33), moderate evening (N = 4) or moderate
morning (N = 3) types. Time of day of testing ranged between 08:00
hours and 18:00 hours (median 15:00 hours) in the non‐optimal con-
dition, and between 09:00 hours and 18:00 hours (median 11:00
hours) in the optimal condition. The average testing time difference
between conditions was significant (Mann–Whitney U‐test, p <
.005). Additionally, Spearman correlation analyses evidenced a nega-
tive correlation between MEQ chronotype score and Optimal
moment (r = −.375, p = .017), as well as a positive correlation
between chronotype and Non‐Optimal moment (r = .378, p = .016).
The mean sleep duration during the previous month (t33,451 =
0.88, p = .385), sleep quantity (Mann–Whitney test: U = 193, p =
.849) and quality (U = 161, p = .268) for the previous night, vocabu-
lary (U = 135, p = .077) and depression score (U = 148.5, p = .161)
did not differ between Optimal and Non‐Optimal moments. For the
Mill‐Hill vocabulary score, the between‐group effect approached sig-
nificance (0.08), but the Bayesian factor was 0.567, i.e. inconclusive
(a Bayes factor > 3 is considered as substantial evidence for the
alternative hypothesis [H1], values < 0.333 indicate substantial evi-
dence for the null [H0], and values between 0.333 and 3 indicate a
lack of sensitivity; Dienes, 2011).
3.2 | Sleepiness and vigilance
Results disclosed higher subjective sleepiness as measured by the
self‐reported KSS at Non‐Optimal (mean and SD: 4.3 ± 2.11) com-
pared with Optimal (mean and SD: 3.125 ± 1.24; ANOVA: F1,38 =
5.853, p = .02) moments (Figure 3). Regarding vigilance, no moment‐
related differences were found with the PVT either with perfor-
mance computed on the mean reaction time (U = 195, p = .892) for
participants tested at their Optimal (mean and SD: 341.45 ± 23.08)
and Non‐Optimal (mean and SD: 348.55 ± 36.26) moments, or on
the reciprocal response time (1/RT) (t38 = 0.768, p = .447) at Optimal
(mean and SD: 3.03 ± 0.2) and Non‐Optimal (mean and SD: 2.97 ±
0.29) moments.
3.3 | Word‐stem completion scores
Table 2 summarizes the proportions of stems completed with the
target words for the participants evaluated at their Optimal or Non‐
Optimal moments in the Inclusion and Exclusion (for Lag 0, Lag 3,
Lag 12) and in the Baseline conditions.
In the baseline condition, an ANOVA was computed on the com-
pletion scores for the New items with the between‐subject factor
Moment (Optimal versus Non‐Optimal) and the within‐subject factor
Condition (Inclusion versus Exclusion). The factors Moment (F1,38 =
1.134, p = .294) and Condition (F1,38 = 0.01, p = .919) and their
interaction were all non‐significant (F1,38 = 0.507, p = .481), indicat-
ing that the probability of completing a stem with the target word
by chance was the same at Optimal and Non‐Optimal moments, and
that both groups used the same criterion for responding in both con-
ditions (Adam et al., 2005). Similarly, we compared completion
scores at Lag 0 (i.e. immediate presentation of the stem after the
word; a condition mainly ensuring that participants followed the
TABLE 1 Chronotype, sleep, vocabulary, depression parameters
and time of testing
Optimal Non‐Optimal p‐value
MEQ
Global score 50.55 ± 8.51 51.9 ± 5.66 .558
PSQI
Global score 5.2 ± 2.37 5 ± 2.47 .989
Sleep duration (hr) 8.05 ± 0.85 7.75 ± 1.26 .385
St Mary's questionnaire
Sleep duration (hr) 7.676 ± 1.57 7.741 ± 1.52 .849
Quality of sleep 4.3 ± 0.86 4.6 ± 1.14 .268
Mill‐Hill
Score (part b) 34.95 ± 5.07 33.25 ± 3.43 .077
BDI‐II
Score 4.8 ± 5.37 6.25 ± 4.39 .161
Testing time (hr) 11.85 ± 3.52 15.05 ± 2.89 .003
BDI, Beck Depression Inventory‐II; MEQ, Morningness–Eveningness
Questionnaire; PSQI, Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index.
F IGURE 3 Sleepiness scores (Karolinska Sleepiness Scale; KSS) at
Optimal (blue lines) versus Non‐Optimal (blue squares) experimental
conditions. Error bars represent standard deviations
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Exclusion versus Inclusion instructions) between the Optimal and
Non‐Optimal conditions. No moment‐related differences were found
at Lag 0 both in the Inclusion (t38 = 1.453, p = .154) and Exclusion
(t38 = 1, p = .324) conditions. Therefore, the remaining analyses on
memory retrieval were conducted on representative Lag 3 and Lag
12 only.
Regarding completion scores for the learned items, an ANOVA
was conducted on the proportion of stems completed with the tar-
get word in the Inclusion condition with the between‐subject factor
Moment (Optimal versus Non‐Optimal) and the within‐subject factor
Lag interval (Lag 3 versus Lag 12). The analysis disclosed a main Lag
interval effect (F1,38 = 14.807, p < .01). Post hoc planned compar-
isons showed that the two lag intervals significantly differed one
from the other (p < .05), with a decreasing completion score at
increasing intervals (Lag 3 > Lag 12). There was also a main Group
effect (F1,38 = 4.192, p = .048), with a higher completion score at
the Optimal (mean score and SD: 0.800 ± 0.023) compared with the
Non‐Optimal (0.734 ± 0.023) moment. The interaction effect was
not significant (F1,38 = 0.076, p = .785).
In the Exclusion condition, a similar ANOVA conducted on the
proportion of stems completed with the target word also disclosed a
main Lag interval effect (F1,38 = 4.861, p = .034), with more comple-
tions (i.e. errors in this Exclusion condition) as lag interval increased.
Post hoc planned comparisons evidenced differences between the
two lag intervals (Lag 3 < Lag 12; p < .05). There was also a main
Moment effect (F1,38 = 5.828, p = .021), with a higher erroneous
completion rate at the Non‐Optimal (0.164 ± 0.023) compared with
the Optimal (0.086 ± 0.023) moment. The Moment × Lag interval
interaction effect was not significant (F1,38 = 0.778, p = .383).
3.4 | Estimates of controlled and automatic
processes
In a second step, we estimated the respective contribution of auto-
matic and controlled memory processes (Table 3) by using the alge-
braic transformations described above (see Section 7).
The estimates of controlled processes (Figure 4) were analysed
with a repeated‐measures ANOVA, with the between‐subject factor
Moment (Optimal versus Non‐Optimal) and the within‐subject factor
Lag interval (Lag 3 versus Lag 12). There was a main Lag interval
effect (F1,38 = 16.163, p < .001), with higher estimates of controlled
processes at shorter lags (Table 3; Lag 3 = 0.709 > Lag 12 = 0.575;
all planned comparisons p < .05). There was also a main Moment
effect (F1,38 = 8.533, p < .01), with higher estimates of controlled
processes at the Optimal (0.714 ± 0.035) compared with the
TABLE 2 Mean probabilities of completing stems with the target words in each condition (Inclusion and Exclusion) and for each item type




n New Lag 0 Lag 3 Lag 12
Inclusion condition
Non‐optimal 20 0.125 (0.083) 1 (0) 0.781 (0.133) 0.687 (0.143)
Optimal 20 0.118 (0.069) 0.987 (0.03) 0.84 (0.11) 0.759 (0.09)
Exclusion condition
Non‐optimal 20 0.134 (0.06) 0 (0) 0.131 (0.129) 0.196 (0.162)
Optimal 20 0.106 (0.06) 0.006 (0.027) 0.071 (0.08) 0.1 (0.09)
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. New: baseline items (never presented); Lag 0: lag interval 0 item; Lag 3: lag interval 3 items; Lag 12: lag
interval 12 items.
TABLE 3 Estimates of controlled and automatic memory




n Lag 3 Lag 12
Controlled processes (C = I − E)
Non‐optimal 20 0.65 (0.19) 0.49 (0.25)
Optimal 20 0.76 (0.13) 0.65 (0.14)
Automatic processes (A = E/(1 − C))
Non‐optimal 20 0.36 (0.26) 0.32 (0.203)
Optimal 20 0.31 (0.29) 0.25 (0.21)





























F IGURE 4 Estimates of controlled memory processes at
increasing lag interval (3 versus 12) in the Optimal (Opt) and Non‐
Optimal (N‐Opt) moment conditions. **p = .01. Error bars are
standard deviations
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Non‐Optimal (0.570 ± 0.035) moment. There was no interaction
effect (F1,38 = 0.559, p = .459).
The estimates of automatic processes (Figure 5) were also anal-
ysed with a repeated‐measures ANOVA, with the between‐subject
factor Moment (Optimal versus Non‐Optimal) and the within‐subject
factor Lag interval (Lag 3 versus Lag 12). First, the analysis showed
that the estimates for automatic processes were significantly higher
than the probability to complete stems by chance at Lags 3 and 12
both at the Optimal moment (Lag 3: t19 = 2.78, p = .012; Lag 12: t19
= 2.93, p < .01) and at the Non‐Optimal moment (Lag 3: t19 = 4.11,
p < .01; Lag 12: t19 = 4.57, p < .01). Second, the repeated‐measures
ANOVA computed on the estimates of automatic processes revealed
no significant main effect of Moment (F1,38 = 0.749, p = .392) or Lag
interval (F1,38 = 1.398, p = .244), nor an interaction effect (F1,38 =
0.064, p = .801).
4 | DISCUSSION
In this study, we aimed at investigating the impact of the moment of
day subjectively defined as optimal or non‐optimal for cognitive per-
formance on the controlled and automatic processes subtending
retrieval in episodic memory, using an adaptation (Adam et al., 2005)
of the PDP (Jacoby, 1991). In line with our hypothesis and prior lit-
erature (Hasher et al., 2002; May & Hasher, 1998; May et al., 1993;
West, Murphy, Armilio, Craik, & Stuss, 2002; Yang et al., 2007), our
results disclosed more efficient controlled processes for participants
evaluated at their optimal compared with their non‐optimal moment.
At variance, our results did not evidence any impact of the optimal
versus non‐optimal testing time on automatic processes in memory
retrieval. This result did not confirm prior findings suggesting that
automatic processes involved in implicit and procedural memory are
more efficient at the individual's non‐optimal moment, when con-
trolled processes do not oppose their expression (Delpouve et al.,
2014; Hasher et al., 2002; May et al., 1993, 2005).
Although our results are in agreement with the findings of a pre-
vious study (Yang et al., 2007), it must be noted that their method
was markedly different as they used a speeded stem completion
task. Individual automatic or controlled retrieval processes were
determined by comparing participants’ response times in the seman-
tic retrieval phase versus the study phase. The authors posited that
controlled processes are recruited when participants slowed down in
the semantic retrieval phase, whereas those who maintained stable
reaction times between the semantic and study phases were
assumed to have relied mostly on automatic retrieval. Although the
procedure also aimed at separating controlled and automatic retrie-
val, increased or decreased reaction times in a memory task might
also have alternative causes. For instance, changes in focused atten-
tion and vigilance can also increase reaction times in producing a
correct answer. This possibility was not assessed in this previous
study, unlike our current study for which vigilance and sleepiness
parameters were measured. Another possible confound is that per-
formance in a reputedly implicit memory task might be to some
extent contaminated by intentional and controlled memory pro-
cesses. Conversely, automatic, unintentional processes can modulate
explicit memory performance. For instance, amnesiacs demonstrated
evidence of knowledge on an explicit memory test when encouraged
to guess (Weiskrantz & Warrington, 1975), suggesting that memory
retrieval parameters cannot be used as a process‐pure measure.
In this respect, we argue that our revised version of the PDP is
particularly appropriate for segregating the contribution of controlled
and automatic processes within a memory task, independently of
reaction time differences. The task was shown to be efficient and
sensitive in pathological conditions, for instance with Alzheimer's dis-
ease (Adam et al., 2005; Knight, 1998; Smith & Knight, 2002). Other
studies used a similar PDP approach to evidence partially dissociated
cerebral substrates in the acquisition of explicit and implicit knowl-
edge in a serial reaction time task (Destrebecqz et al., 2005). Addi-
tionally, methodological precautions were taken in order to prevent
problems that may limit the applicability of the PDP, such as poor
task sensitivity, ceiling and/or floor effects in performance, lack of
control over comprehension of instructions, and lack of baseline
measurements. In the Adam et al. (2005) study, these elements were
carefully accounted for in a rigorous manner, which is why we
specifically chose to use this variant of the word‐stem completion
task to apply the PDP. Limits and boundary conditions of the PDP
have also been extensively discussed in the past years (Yonelinas &
Jacoby, 2012). Nonetheless, we acknowledge that there is an ongo-
ing debate around the different paradigms aimed at capturing con-
trolled‐automatic distinctions. For instance, the PDP and the
Remember‐Know (R‐K) paradigms (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson‐
Klavehn, 1998) seem to capture partially different dimensions, which
might lead to different results (Espinosa‐Garcia, Vaquero, Milliken, &
Tudela, 2017). Still, Espinosa‐Garcia et al. proposed that at the time
of retrieval, recollection measured using the PDP might more exclu-
sively engage controlled memory search processes than the R‐K, in
which case the PDP paradigm would be more appropriate for study-
























F IGURE 5 Estimates of automatic memory processes at
increasing lag interval (3 versus 12) in Optimal (Opt) and Non‐
Optima (N‐Ot) moment conditions. Error bars are standard
deviations
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Discrepancies about automatic processes with prior findings
might stem from our PDP method, which differs from previous stud-
ies by at least two features. First, contrary to our procedure, previ-
ous studies used separate, independent tasks to segregate controlled
and automatic retrieval processes in memory (Hasher et al., 2002;
May et al., 1993, 2005). For instance, Hasher et al. (2005) used two
different implicit and explicit stem completion tasks, and an implicit
category generation task. In the explicit task, participants were
instructed to complete the stems with words of the learning list,
alternatively with the first word that came to their mind. As dis-
cussed previously, conscious (controlled) and automatic recall can
contribute in parallel to performance in this explicit condition, hence
a contamination effect. We ourselves reported better performance
at non‐optimal compared with optimal time in an implicit artificial
grammar learning (AGL) task (Delpouve et al., 2014), but failed in the
present study to evidence differences for the automatic component
of memory processing, which suggests that the effect is driven by
various factors, amongst others the type of task and conditions (e.g.
implicit detection of regularities during exposure to strings of letters
without instruction to learn in the AGL task, whereas participants
are exposed to meaningful verbal material with explicit instructions
to learn for future use in the present study).
Second, synchrony effects were tested in our study by evaluating
each participant at the time of day subjectively defined as being the
most optimal or non‐optimal moment for cognitive performance. In
previous studies (Hasher et al., 2002; May & Hasher, 1998), optimal
and non‐optimal time of day moments for testing were derived from
the individual's chronotype score obtained after the completion of a
MEQ (Horne & Östberg, 1976). Subjective sleepiness as assessed
with the KSS was higher in the non‐optimal than in the optimal con-
dition in our participants, like our prior study (Delpouve et al., 2014),
suggesting the validity of a subjective determination of cognitive
efficiency. Notwithstanding, further studies are needed to better
understand the arguably multidimensional determinants of subjec-
tively‐defined optimal/non‐optimal time of day (Dijk & von Schantz,
2005), and as well to determine the test–retest reliability of our sub-
jective time of day optimality measure, and to what extent it is asso-
ciated with physiological modifications such as dim light melatonin
onset, as shown with the well‐established MEQ (Kantermann & East-
man, 2018; Kantermann, Sung, & Burgess, 2015). Besides differences
in chronotype, preferred time of day for a demanding cognitive
activity (i.e. optimal time in the context of our study) might also be
subtended by various variables, such as light–dark and social cycles,
meal time, environmental settings such as light exposure and motiva-
tional variables, to name a few. We argue that prior studies that
used the MEQ to determine morning versus evening preference may
have to some extent neglected the relative contribution of these
various elements. In this respect, asking participants to define opti-
mal versus non‐optimal time of day purely based on their subjective
feeling is a possible way to circumvent the difficulty to control these
variables. Interestingly, we disclosed moderate negative and positive
correlations between the MEQ score and subjectively‐defined Opti-
mal and Non‐Optimal moments, respectively, suggesting that MEQ
actually captures elements related to optimal and non‐optimal time
of day for cognitive performance. Conversely, subjective determina-
tion of optimal and non‐optimal periods in an individual partially
reflects chronotype, with the additional advantage that a purely sub-
jective evaluation is more precise in the determination of the best/
worst moment within a day to carry on a specific activity, if we con-
sider the wide range of hours defined as optimal (09:00–18:00
hours) or non‐optimal (08:00–18:00 hours) by our participants.
Nonetheless, it was recently reported that young neutral type indi-
viduals (like in the present study) do not exhibit significant effects of
time of testing over the day (i.e. morning, midday and evening) on
inhibitory processing, flexibility, memory, perceptual speed and
access to well‐learned knowledge (May & Hasher, 2017). Although
the results from this latter study might suggest limited variations in
cognitive performance at the group level all over the day for neutral
chronotype participants exhibiting similar features than our popula-
tion, it is also possible that assessments made at three fixed time of
day periods do not capture the subjective experience of optimality/
non‐optimality at the individual level, which we have seen widely
distributed all along the day across participants. From our perspec-
tive, it reinforces the hypothesis that time of day for high versus
poor cognitive performance might be better defined using subjec-
tively‐defined periods. If our hypothesis is correct, differences in per-
formance between subjectively‐defined optimal and non‐optimal
time of day should be evidenced for the same tasks than the ones
used in the May and Hasher (2017) study. Further studies should
investigate this issue.
A potential limitation of our study is that we used a between‐
subject design (i.e. participants were tested either at their optimal or
non‐optimal moment) due to task constraints, whereas a within‐sub-
ject design might have better controlled for inter‐individual differ-
ences. Also, the impact of other cognitive processes on the
controlled and automatic components of memory retrieval should be
accounted for and specifically tested in future studies. For instance,
reduced inhibition at non‐optimal time of day can also impact correct
response production, especially in the Exclusion condition in which
perseverations must be avoided. Likewise, changes in cognitive flexi-
bility may also interfere with performance when participants need to
switch response patterns between the Inclusion and Exclusion condi-
tions.
Altogether, our results emphasize the importance of accounting
for potential interactions between controlled and automatic memory
processes in the neuropsychological evaluation of episodic verbal
memory, in addition to the time of day at which tasks are com-
pleted.
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